Russian economic, geological and political studies
- General features of economy in the periods of Yeltsin’s market reforms
The two essential and mutually dependent goals – both stabilizing the macro-economy and achieving economic reformation – marked the changeover from a central plan to a market based economy. This concerned the implementation of financial strategies that promoted commercial development in a setting of steady prices and degrees of conversion. The latter required the formation of commercial, legal along with institutional entities that could allow the frugality to operate effectively. Opening of the home markets to international businesses could enhance a significant aid in attaining the goals. Under Gorbachev, the government did not address these vital goals (Reddaay and Dmitri 57). By the end of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin regime had started attacking the problematic issues of macroeconomic stabilization and economic reformation. When Yeltsin’s regime took over, they came up with an ambitious program of essential economic reforms; until now, the records show that their economic goals could have been unrealistic. Another complicated issue in their reform program was that since the year 1991 the political as well as economic power had gone down considerably from the national to the regional level.
In relation to macroeconomic stabilization, the Yeltsin program laid out several policy actions concerning macroeconomics for the purpose of attaining stabilization. It necessitated sharp minimization in government expenditure, targeting expenditures for community investment projects, defense, as well as manufacturer and buyer grants. The program was aiming at minimizing the government budget debit from its 1991 level of 20% of GDP to about 9% of GDP by the 2nd half of the year 1992, and to about 3% by the year 1993. The Yeltsin regime, therefore, introduced new taxes, and collection of tax was raised for the purpose of increasing state revenues (Reddaay and Dmitri 61). In the fiscal sphere, the economic program necessitated that the Russian Central Bank (RCD), reduce the credits to ventures as well as limit the increase funds supply. The program necessitated the reduction of price increases from 12% every month during the year 1991 to about 4% every month by mid-1993.
Immediately after the end of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsin regime increased price controls on about 90% of the consumer products and about 80% of intermediate products. It increased but was still controlling energy costs and foodstuff staples like bread, sugar, vodka as well as the dairy products. These measures were for the purpose of establishing a sensible association between manufacturing and consumption that was lacking in the central plan system. To initiate the establishment of the private division, major essential changes were made in the system of taxation which included the introduction of value added tax (VAT) of about 28% on several deals, a progressive revenue levy, and a levy on business earnings; amendments in the importation tariffs systems and export levies; new levies on domestic energy utilizations for the purpose of encouraging conservation; as well as new levies on oil and natural gases exportation in order to reduce the gap between controlled domestic prices as well as the global prices and for the prevention of domestic energy scarcities (Clark 89). A constant rate of exchange was to be introduced for the ruble, which could thereafter become translatable. Numerous limitations of international businesses were also to be introduced for the purpose of exposing Russia to guideline of the global prices.
Between the year 1992 and 1993, the Yeltsin regime expanded the financial supply and loans at greater rates that resulted in high price increases and a decline in the rate of exchange of the ruble. In the beginning of 1992, the regime came down hard on financial and loan creation during the same time that it increased the price controls. However, by February the same year, the RCB slackened off the reins on the financial supply. The sharp increment in the financial was as a result of increased deposition of foreign currency that was state-running businesses and individuals had established themselves and by the devaluation of the ruble. Businesses drew on the deposits for the purpose of paying wages as well as other expenses after the regime that had tautened restrictions on emissions of funds (Clark 89). The commercial banks were monetizing businesses’ debts through the drawdown of accounts in the foreign banks. The regime’s efforts of controlling credit increase were proving to be transient in the beginning of the changeover.
Domestic credit augmented by about 9 times towards the end of the year 1991. The credit increment was partly as a result of the establishment of inter-enterprise debts plus RCB’s succeeding funding of those debts. The regime restricted funding to state businesses after the lifting of price controls in early 1992 though businesses faced cash deficiencies for the reason that decontrol of prices reduced the demand of their produces. The Yeltsin regime failed to restrain its own spending especially under the control of the conformist Supreme Soviet, which was encouraging the soviet style funding of the most favored industries toward the end of the year 1992, the country’s budget shortfallwas about 20% of the GDP. This budget shortfall was financed mainly through the expansion of the financial supply. These ineffective financial policies led to an increment in the rate of price risesby over 2000% in the year 1992. Towards the end of 1992, the declining economic status and a great fight with the parliament resulted in the dismissal of Yegor Gaydar and economic reform activists. In the year 1993, money printing and credit increase weakened. In an open battle with the parliament, Yeltsin emerged as a winner of the referendum on his proposed economic reformation policies that could have provided the reformers with some political clout for curbing state outlay. Later on the ministry of finance as well as the RCB accepted macroeconomic measures including subsidies and the increment of revenues for the purpose of stabilizing the economy (Clark 92).
The year of economic restructurings, retail prices in Russia augmented by 2,520 percent in 1992. The main cause of the increase was the deregulation of most prices by early 1992, a stride that stimulated an average price augment of 245 percent in January alone. The annual rate had depreciated to 840 percent by 1993, still an elevated digit. In 1994 the rate of increase in prices had upgraded to 224 percent.
The drifts in annual inflation rate cover variations in monthly rate, but in 19194 the government managed to slash down monthly rates from 21 percent to 4 percent within nine months. However the rate ascended again to 16.4 percent by the end of the year and 18 percent by January 1995. The differences in Russian economic policy were cause by instability. The government untied its limit to react to demands for tributes by industries in the far north, agriculture and huge enterprises. The pattern was sidestepped successfully in 1995 by upholding the tight economic policy embraced at the begging of that year and by passing a somewhat rigorous budget. Hence, the rate of monthly increase in prices was held steady less 5 percent in the last section of the year. The rate increase in prices was 16.5 percent by mid-1996(Clark 112). However, the professionals noted that regulation of prices rate was assisted by failure to pay salaries to employees in Government enterprises.
The instability of the Russian macro-economy has been seen through severe oscillation in the rate of exchange of the ruble. The ruble was first legally exchanged for the United State dollars from July 1992 to October 1995, the rate of exchange between the dollar and the ruble weakened from 144 rubles for each dollar to about 5000 for each dollar. But swift variations in the nominal rate mirrored the general macro-economic instability. The maximum radical example was the black Tuesday in 1994 where there was 27 percent decrease in the ruble’s worth.
The RCB declared its plans to uphold the ruble within 4,300 to 4900 for each dollar but it later extended the period for twelve months, between July1995 to June1996. The declaration mirrored empowering the economic policies and the accumulation of reserves with which the state could protect the ruble. The ruble had alleviated by October 1995, it remained steady till mid-1996. A creeping band exchange rate was presented to make the ruble decline slowly until it reached 6,100 ruble per dollar.
Privatization program is the core of economic reform and thought for external loan and venture in Russia’s economy. The supporter of reform Chubays encouraged for privatization during its early development. Privatization of small businesses started in 1992 through worker acquisitions and public sale. In a period of one year about 80 percent of Russian small businesses and more than 80000 RussianGovernment enterprises had been privatized.
Vouchers with a nominal worth of 63 US dollars were circulated to millions to Russian citizens for acquisition of shares in enterprises that bureaucrats had selected for this kind of privatization. On the other hand, the vouchers owner could retail the vouchers or they could capitalize them in voucher coffers.
The financial representative declared extension of privatization program with an emphasis to retailing up to fifteen huge state companies, just to mention a few, the Joint Stock company and the Russian State Insurance Company. Despite intervallic postponements, assertion of favoritism and fraudulent transaction in the enterprises and monetary structures the privatization program was a success.
- The general features of climate in North Eastern Eurasia
Climate changes in the northeastern Eurasia led to increased cryogenic activity greatly affecting the landscapes as well as the socioeconomic systems within the permafrost region. The northeastern Eurasia is a large area which is characterized by different sets of landscape that ranges from Arctic tundra to steppes as well as from coastal lowlands to very high mountains of glacier. This determines the varsity of scenery dynamics. Climate changes in the key aspect that influences the dynamics of modern landscapes. Thus longitudinal patterns in the distribution of the climatic variations in northeastern Eurasia have been documented. A map was produced of the northern part of Russia indicating the linear trends in mean annual ground temperature. The map divided northeastern Eurasia into 3 parts with varying trends in increasing Mean Annual Air Temperature (MAAT). The northeastern Eurasia exhibits disparities in MAAT trends. The greatest disparities in the trends were evident in winter and spring.
Climatic changes are not uniform all over northeastern Eurasia. Climatic changes in thearea has mainly been linked to variations in the winter temperature, which can be expressed by the cooling index as a total value of the measure of negative mean daily air temperature. At the time of cooling the ends of the cooling index are normally positively maximum in all the landscapes. Regardless of such significant variations in climatic conditions, the reaction of ground temperatures is not equally pronounced (Fedorov10). The climatic conditions also show that the geo-cryological dangers for landscapes are not so strong. The moderatelylow ground temperatures in the northeastern Eurasia are promoting the stabilization of the thawing depth. Shallower thawing in unfrozen ground is usually observed in regions of discontinuous and sporadic permafrost. This has led to increased activities of the cryogenic processes including thermal abrasion of the coasts lines as well as thermal erosion in the southern parts of the northeastern Eurasia. The great thermokarst activity experienced recently all over the region leading to hummocky polygonal relief on the ice complexes is showing proofs of changes in permafrost (Fedorov15).
The political situation and economic, social and environmental conditions in the USSR and Russia in the phase ofKhrushchev
Political and economic situations
The phase of Khrushchev is the time between the beginning of 1950s to the beginning of 1960s the time repression as well as censorship in the USSR were upturned.Khrushchevintroduced irreversible transformation of the whole Soviet society through the opening of a number of economic reforms, and global trade, contacts of education among others. Even though the power fight between the liberals and the pro-Stalinists never came to an end, it managed to weaken the Soviet communist gathering. Khrushchev was the 1st secretary after the death of Stalin, He initiated an era of cultural thaw as well as de-steadiness for the purpose of devolving the USSR system of suppression and privacy and for the purpose of realizing the dream of socialism. He had a goal of boosting agricultural yields. There was a short-term union between Khrushchev and Zhukov which was initiated on their comparable family setting, benefits as well as weaknesses. They were both practiced faming (Shleifer and Treisma 116). Khrushchev and Zhukov worked collaboratively when there was necessity of eliminating their common political enemies.
Khrushchev efforts in trying to reform the Soviet trade infrastructure resulted in his battle with experts in several of the divisions of the Soviet economy. The restructurings of the managerial style instigated him complications. Khrushchev exchanged the manufacturing agencies in Moscow by provincial assembly of people’s economy rendering him rivalry from the top officials in regime.Sooner or later Khrushchev authority decline gradually and could not be equated to Stalin’s. Younger, more cultivated and great intellectual individuals were the new people who joined the soviet ladder.
He attempted to introduce the model of minimum salary; the idea was faced with disparagement from communist who argued that minimum salary was very small. When Khrushchev ordered to change the outdated money with Stalin’s portrait he clogged the economic restructurings. Later in on, the Soviet civilization took pleasure in so many events; these included cultural events, sport activities and entertainment such as cinemas, amusements and music fiestas. Some of the artist and moviemakers were permitted to appear in the diaspora in order to epitomize its beliefs and society globally. A contract was signed between the Soviet and the United States regime in 1956 to recommence the publishing and circulation of Amerika, a United State magazine, in Soviet Union and to introduce its counterpart in the United States of America.
Social and environmental conditions
Khrushchev permitted liberty of information in the media, artistic as well as cultural elements including global festivals, foreign movies, uncensored articles as well as novel varieties of entertainment on the upcoming national televisions which ranges from great parades as well as celebrations. Artistsand particularly instrumentalists were permitted to access resources that were previously prohibited before the Khrushchev’s restructuring. The composers during his era had the accessibility of scores by other composers which helped them to gain inspiration from the hidden musical scores. A Composer who belonged to the Soviet attained accessibility of the novel scores and were provided with a taste of liberty of expression towards the end of the year 1950, 2 distinct groupings started emerging. One of the groups was in charge of for writing the official music which was supported by the musicians who were part of the union.The other group was accountable for writing informal music. Even though the 2 groupings were widely considered as codependentmany considered the informal music scene as more independent as well as influential in terms of politics that the official group (Shleifer and Treisma 123). The informal music came up in two different phases. Phase one of the informal music was represented by presentations of relaxing pieces. From a musician’s point of view, the pieces were relaxing in a way that their sounds and configuration extracted from the demands of communal realism.
Despite the intents of the musicians, the impact of their music on their listenersall through the USSR and abroad, enabled the listeners’ think of alternate possibilities to the ones proposed by the Soviet leaders. Even though the music of the younger age groups of informal Soviet musicians experienced a prevalent success within the West, its successfulness within the USSR union was apparent. Even after the collapse of Khrushchev’s reign, the liberty that musicians and listeners were feeling through the informal concerts lasted for quite a long time. However regardless of the great role played by the informal music that were being played in the USSR at the time of the thaw, most of the music that was being written at that time continued to be managed (Shleifer and Treisma 142). Because of this, much of the informal music was not documented. For this reason, a lot of what is known currently concerning the informal music in the reign of Khrushchev can only be sourced through discussions with those musicians, and the listeners who had the chance of witnessing the informal music scene during those times. Khrushchev reign lead to extraordinary social, cultural as well economic changes in the Soviet Union. The sixth global festivals for the youths lead to numerous social trends that stemmed from the festival. Many Russian females got engaged in love matters with guys who were visiting from different parts of the world.
Clark, Terry D, Ernest Goss, and Larisa Kosova.Changing Attitudes Toward Economic Reform During the Yeltsin Era. Westport (Connecticut: Praeger, 2003. Print.
Fedorov, Arnest, et al. “Recent air temperature changes in the permafrost landscapes of northeastern Eurasia.” Polar Science 8.2 (2014): 114-128.
Reddaway, Peter, and Dmitri Glinski.The tragedy of Russia’s reforms: market bolshevism against democracy. US Institute of Peace Press, 2001.
Shleifer, Arnold, and Treisman, Diane. Without a map: Political tactics and economic reform in Russia. MIT Press. 2000.